THIS IS A TEST INSTANCE. ALL YOUR CHANGES WILL BE LOST!!!!
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{span:style=font-size:2em;font-weight:bold} JAX-RS: SAML {span}
{toc}
h1. Introduction
CXF 2.5.0 introduces an initial support for working with [SAML2|http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAML_2.0] assertions. So far the main focus has been put on making sure SAML assertions can be included in HTTP requests targeted at application endpoints: embedded inside XML payloads or passed as encoded HTTP header or form values. Support for advanced SAML features such as Web Browser SSO Profile will be coming in due time.
h1. Maven dependencies
{code:xml}
<dependency>
<groupId>org.apache.cxf</groupId>
<artifactId>cxf-rt-rs-security-xml</artifactId>
<version>2.5.0</version>
</dependency>
{code}
This module depends on CXF WS-Security and Apache WSS4J modules, due to them containing a lot of useful utility code.
We will see in time if it will make sense to exclude such dependencies or not.
h1. Enveloped SAML assertions
Payload:
{code:xml}
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://org.apache.cxf/rs/env">
<Book ID="67ca6441-0c4e-4430-af0e-9463ce9226aa">
<id>125</id>
<name>CXF</name>
</Book>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<!-- Book signature, omitted for brewity -->
</ds:Signature>
<!-- SAML assertion with an enveloped signature -->
<saml2:Assertion xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" ID="_62D574706635C0B9F413203247720501" IssueInstant="2011-11-03T12:52:52.050Z" Version="2.0" xsi:type="saml2:AssertionType">
<saml2:Issuer>https://idp.example.org/SAML2</saml2:Issuer>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
<ds:Reference URI="#_62D574706635C0B9F413203247720501">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<ec:InclusiveNamespaces xmlns:ec="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#" PrefixList="xs"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>IDD9nFocVm/7FpUbiGI3ZvpY2ps=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>JA2I7u/SmNsXGgWNdrLSovkipiM3JmGHsmpoP0EeIOwPwnLMx0WvV0C3xNGNiT1jOBe2uv8+WchtPoppGTC2JTJVX/t8PmKQCYZo4kVJo6Nmsjbn5kp7ejWuOYynvrUheQeTLU8e5CQmuS6L4VYaMVV2ETtb0VvpKjoQKHOC+co=</ds:SignatureValue>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509Certificate><!-- Omitted for brewity --> </ds:X509Certificate>
</ds:X509Data>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
<saml2:Subject>
<saml2:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified" NameQualifier="www.mock-sts.com">uid=sts-client,o=mock-sts.com</saml2:NameID>
<saml2:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:sender-vouches"/>
</saml2:Subject>
<saml2:Conditions NotBefore="2011-11-03T12:52:52.063Z" NotOnOrAfter="2011-11-03T12:52:52.063Z">
<saml2:AudienceRestriction>
<saml2:Audience>https://sp.example.com/SAML2</saml2:Audience>
</saml2:AudienceRestriction>
</saml2:Conditions>
<saml2:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2011-11-03T12:52:51.981Z" SessionIndex="123456">
<saml2:AuthnContext><saml2:AuthnContextClassRef/></saml2:AuthnContext>
</saml2:AuthnStatement>
<saml2:AttributeStatement>
<saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="subject-role"
Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/role"
NameFormat="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims">
<saml2:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">user</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
<saml2:Attribute Name="http://claims/authentication"
NameFormat="http://claims/authentication-format">
<saml2:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">password</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
</saml2:AttributeStatement>
</saml2:Assertion>
</env:Envelope>
{code}
Note that Book and SAML assertion are individually signed but the envelope wrapper itself is not.
Here is another payload showing the whole enveloped signed including Book and SAML Assertion, this time only a single signature will be available:
{code:xml}
<env:Envelope xmlns:env="http://org.apache.cxf/rs/env" ID="e795cdd1-c19d-4a5c-8d86-e8a781af4787">
<saml2:Assertion xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" ID="_C76E3D5BBEE4C4D87913203281641141" IssueInstant="2011-11-03T13:49:24.114Z" Version="2.0" xsi:type="saml2:AssertionType">
<saml2:Issuer>https://idp.example.org/SAML2</saml2:Issuer>
<saml2:Subject>
<saml2:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified" NameQualifier="www.mock-sts.com">uid=sts-client,o=mock-sts.com</saml2:NameID>
<saml2:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:sender-vouches"/>
</saml2:Subject>
<saml2:Conditions NotBefore="2011-11-03T13:49:24.127Z" NotOnOrAfter="2011-11-03T13:49:24.127Z">
<saml2:AudienceRestriction>
<saml2:Audience>https://sp.example.com/SAML2</saml2:Audience>
</saml2:AudienceRestriction>
</saml2:Conditions>
<saml2:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2011-11-03T13:49:24.044Z" SessionIndex="123456">
<saml2:AuthnContext>
<saml2:AuthnContextClassRef/>
</saml2:AuthnContext>
</saml2:AuthnStatement>
<saml2:AttributeStatement>
<saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="subject-role" Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/role" NameFormat="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims">
<saml2:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xsi:type="xs:string">user</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
<saml2:Attribute Name="http://claims/authentication" NameFormat="http://claims/authentication-format">
<saml2:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xsi:type="xs:string">password</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
</saml2:AttributeStatement>
</saml2:Assertion>
<Book>
<id>125</id>
<name>CXF</name>
</Book>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/><ds:Reference URI="#e795cdd1-c19d-4a5c-8d86-e8a781af4787"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/><ds:DigestValue>GR1pHd2JpxYiCzl6ouCmTZjq/AA=</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>C2qUDOFwart2GHFjX6kB3E3z73AMXtRR/6Qjgyp6XP/vTn/Fr2epDNub3q+gNdT0KgjLE2rSynM3QTcpHov9C8l9a8VQquItaalr0XA7BJcxdFMxB7KEATKR9XtrmIEkiw9efM8M83iVux/ufCOWrt0Te2RLz+nRwzyEY49VQOQ=</ds:SignatureValue><ds:KeyInfo><ds:X509Data><ds:X509Certificate><!-- Omitted for brewity --></ds:X509Certificate></ds:X509Data><ds:KeyValue><ds:RSAKeyValue><ds:Modulus>vu747/VShQ85f16DGSc4Ixh9PVpGguyEqrCsK8q9XHOYX9l9/g5wEC6ZcR2FwfNsoaHcKNPjd5sSTzVtBWmQjfBEfIqwTR7vuihOxyNTwEzVwIJzvo7p8/aYxk+VdBtQxq4UweIcf/iFkUbM1cZ1oiXRQzciRBi+C1BQCQE0qzs=</ds:Modulus><ds:Exponent>AQAB</ds:Exponent></ds:RSAKeyValue></ds:KeyValue></ds:KeyInfo></ds:Signature></env:Envelope>
{code}
Server configuration fragment:
{code:xml}
<bean id="serviceBean" class="org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.BookStore"/>
<bean id="samlHandler" class="org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.SamlEnvelopedInHandler"/>
<!-- only needed if the detached signature signing the application data is expected -->
<bean id="xmlSigHandler" class="org.apache.cxf.rs.security.xml.XmlSigInHandler"/>
<jaxrs:server
address="https://localhost:${testutil.ports.jaxrs-saml}/samlxml">
<jaxrs:serviceBeans>
<ref bean="serviceBean"/>
</jaxrs:serviceBeans>
<jaxrs:providers>
<ref bean="xmlSigHandler"/>
<ref bean="samlHandler"/>
</jaxrs:providers>
<jaxrs:properties>
<entry key="ws-security.signature.properties"
value="org/apache/cxf/systest/jaxrs/security/alice.properties"/>
</jaxrs:properties>
</jaxrs:server>
{code}
Client code:
{code:java}
private WebClient createWebClient(String address,
boolean selfSigned) {
JAXRSClientFactoryBean bean = new JAXRSClientFactoryBean();
bean.setAddress(address);
Map<String, Object> properties = new HashMap<String, Object>();
properties.put("ws-security.callback-handler",
"org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.saml.KeystorePasswordCallback");
properties.put("ws-security.saml-callback-handler",
"org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.saml.SamlCallbackHandler");
properties.put("ws-security.signature.username", "alice");
properties.put("ws-security.signature.properties",
"org/apache/cxf/systest/jaxrs/security/alice.properties");
if (selfSigned) {
properties.put("ws-security.self-sign-saml-assertion", "true");
}
bean.setProperties(properties);
bean.getOutInterceptors().add(new SamlEnvelopedOutInterceptor(!selfSigned));
XmlSigOutInterceptor xmlSig = new XmlSigOutInterceptor();
if (selfSigned) {
xmlSig.setStyle(XmlSigOutInterceptor.DETACHED_SIG);
}
return bean.createWebClient();
}
{code}
In the above code, the "ws-security.self-sign-saml-assertion" property, if set to true, will require SamlEnvelopedOutInterceptor to get a SAML assertion self-signed, by adding an enveloped signature to it. When we also need to sign the application payload such as Book we need to make sure that a detached XML signature for Book is created. When the whole envelope is signed then SamlEnvelopedOutInterceptor needs to be placed before XmlSigOutInterceptor hence the "new SamlEnvelopedOutInterceptor(!selfSigned)" constructor is invoked.
h1. SAML assertions in Authorization header
Logging output:
{code:java}
Address: https://localhost:9000/samlheader/bookstore/books/123
Http-Method: GET
Headers: {Accept=[application/xml], Authorization=[SAML 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], ...}
{code}
Note that the Authorization header has an encoded SAML Assertion as its value. The original SAML assertion has been optionally compressed using a deflated encoding and then base64-encoded. This encoded value can be signed itself - but it is not currently possible.
Server configuration is similar to the one from the Enveloped SAML Assertions section, the only difference is that a SAML handler needs to be replaced:
{code:xml}
<bean id="serviceBean" class="org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.BookStore"/>
<bean id="samlHandler" class="org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.SamlHeaderInHandler"/>
<!-- same as in the Enveloped SAML Assertions section -->
{code}
Client code:
{code:java}
private WebClient createWebClient(String address,
boolean selfSigned) {
JAXRSClientFactoryBean bean = new JAXRSClientFactoryBean();
bean.setAddress(address);
Map<String, Object> properties = new HashMap<String, Object>();
properties.put("ws-security.callback-handler",
"org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.saml.KeystorePasswordCallback");
properties.put("ws-security.saml-callback-handler",
"org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.saml.SamlCallbackHandler");
properties.put("ws-security.signature.username", "alice");
properties.put("ws-security.signature.properties",
"org/apache/cxf/systest/jaxrs/security/alice.properties");
if (selfSigned) {
properties.put("ws-security.self-sign-saml-assertion", "true");
}
bean.setProperties(properties);
bean.getOutInterceptors().add(new SamlHeaderOutInterceptor());
return bean.createWebClient();
}
{code}
h1. SAML assertions as Form values
Logging output:
{code:java}
Address: https://localhost:9000/samlform/bookstore/books
Encoding: ISO-8859-1
Http-Method: POST
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Headers: {Accept=[application/xml], Cache-Control=[no-cache], connection=[keep-alive], Content-Length=[2206], content-type=[application/x-www-form-urlencoded], Host=[localhost:9000], Pragma=[no-cache], User-Agent=[Apache CXF ${project.version}]}
Payload: name=CXF&id=125&SAMLToken=eJydV1tzqkgQfs+vsDiPWcNFjWIdUzUIGqJgQMTLyxYOI6BclAFBfv0OGo16kt1ztkrL6p6eb77u6e5pf2Ir8Lk2wBjFiReFFVnsUH8zYqPFAAkwbOsZSK2eKLI1jqlxTY5p8PVnlqrIGKdIDnFihUmH4hiWrZIPUzPYWrtWa3ONJ2K3oComijGBJSZPDFXJAz/E7eORHSqNw3ZkYQ+3QytAuJ3A9hgowzaxbFtnPuc9Oe5QbpJs2zSdZdlTVnuKYofmGIalZ8pwDF0UWJ+23n8bV70jeYjILuy1k8MWdai7YBhESb38PGmPHscvJS4mwJ69fUK5FWx9dEQvqXM/6RvbnzZujz0ntJI0Rh/k7O8cYWiGp4mNjT3nB3XZi2w5XEVHsWuFUehBy/cKq6SnoMSN7ArwnSj2Ejf41mmWKYGrKIdVyNbDHxR9S+03gW4YxtiqYtdiP7B0tEIxIuGsTHS5Q/347xQ6bjNiK8SrKA7wrfhnXFC4R360RXYVn136oPX7gF9E6eUngm05hH6KvT1SyyTdWhDhynuMVl4+9DBJ/Ryf0w7BP7oA+prenXiKhug5CCf/53KuLuYEYlp+il5qDTNiWU3Hz3qxkBCzn0aanw8K7TDvHAlcGx8Vl2s9iXcJeUmg046Q1/bNx0AVHltzNp3pb/KwtizS/nZmHNYYvG6A5G44Bj4bw4msaTYCi93Q5NfL1cBgoBvCw9DbS0GPm43UQnzfJW9JfzUs6nQ/nQh7zXb7EltbPTKPXvSeRSuvvu/LIHWEjTJqJfom5qCJn0W7lSxg34LSPlSMOmitOLyUDNc2PGWpw169tTb5rHNx54p/6dIAHS7uzRoML1qJdRG6ZVtYkQpM0Isiy93+utsF85EDMlkAjiyNTd0BBlAFZ7NzN16fzxgBaJMeEEGh6EomaXPR1LSBlG1d2O+trf4kXdbewgdFy7Kuc1wcSpnqLwOYi2ugCI5qCkAxhKlaXwSqqwj1mWjATBGlTDEA+SXfXkR0Sp3o8pEBigfF0DKVjTKlkAxFkPqAnUhdVxnMZ4I751x/GPCHRSEpCohOa7kiLqaNUNHqmQiOJAi86S77/vphYXSFsLh3SeoBMBLWGsic+YYQl8A+bdabtDl2tVZjxT6L/TGsy7nLv5vbvpMepF3cxQ+D1o6fvY7mM97naaeRSd3nBdS5XrZScWS9woH6vrYbeGwUZiJMA229EqSVvMsMvblPPXeUH1Qjkwozk9+Kh33U3LZoa55vHk1bSLR8V59kSIYr2uttJkuFhQs28ma6VkBPF7zHLitoXU1idgXugkwCwFKairjJZHIpD6bOjAUhyvqyPDU2/GTGLN4nPq9NNrxkTtTJeMKPZqxp6AaYlJfyqkuSaICh4/h4yakkVu4e1rRM1OZvD4NoIRNRLeMkaEAs4+MOs03w2NriQVJ3wqW36RcmYzjb8bQPp/l0QAgWrUTmwme3Bxp7dm2+vlr1Pv/g1jAT5hpnoKxAOr1pOoFjcliut2qqE89fAyMYDixRmBYWtwXpIhVd7bXVJ6X2Zm16yUB4f3yUunysqtvFQ7jbveZ5bbfkkinX2OmJUIjBgOdYx+HflShQYDPd6dqpOu4z/qI81QR9XS031XR+Mcfpco1gchbLBiqLlR7pb1by/fPPPrFHjWdXV0fTdhriLYKEBrKpSomipeQNJGLcocomGERwU8UJfoJRQL2knt0hQhX6HgqTv6LO9fL5gT5xuSPajcKVV55YzkGntvvvUwoM2hiFNoqr+yglUwU+9vUvnSfYtlcC44oaJQIirqFv5qYGT+YmYjQKRzFYJaWX39qd4UFqe2Wb1kn7jj1YHnS/dJlc8OfgQiJyO7hcjO8VN8D0vU+fZyVuOE5ItgQk9pWj+K9DYqtZDoljhMshUSahzDsUy9XqjWfqBpMclaA8+UrX9cmwSN4p+orz9Q76K2oXoIR4tUwT9P1KpReTCNj+ocwZMiKe7rUaRz46ZePlQcbHwRI/kVeYtLPt8WXOcPk4N2jy8WwC7yUHGvqWF2D6E+FcEv8Lh/qF8fE1u5pqczJyk6XQIcVBJttLRG7sX35R/xqJG28/vLBIXEs+0DqN61/486XlR3H/Efstueksiu3f9+Be8+s1E1KFSLpLmYCfmXvWdKgyKUkNBh7pbeiqvi9/El7+Adcbfqw=
{code}
Note that only form 'name' and 'id' fields will remain after the SAML handler processes a SAML assertion encoded in the SAMLToken form field. The original SAML assertion has been optionally compressed using a deflated encoding and then base64-encoded. This encoded value can be signed - but it is not currently possible.
Server configuration is similar to the one from the Enveloped SAML Assertions section, the only difference is that a SAML handler needs to be replaced:
{code:xml}
<bean id="serviceBean" class="org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.BookStore"/>
<bean id="samlHandler" class="org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.SamlFormInHandler"/>
<!-- same as in the Enveloped SAML Assertions section -->
{code}
The client code is the same as in the SAML assertions in Authorization header section except than an instance of SamlFormOutInterceptor has to be registered:
{code:java}
bean.getOutInterceptors().add(new SamlFormOutInterceptor());
{code}
h1. Creating SAML Assertions
If you use CXF JAX-RS client API to experiment with SAML then all you need to do is to register an appropriate out interceptor as shown in the above code fragments. The interceptor will ensure that a SAML assertion is created and added inside the XML envelope, as a form or HTTP header value.
All of the SAML output interceptors depend on a "ws-security.saml-callback-handler" property linking to a custom javax.security.auth.callback.Callback implementation which in its handle(Callbacks) method provides the information which is needed to create a SAML assertion to a org.apache.ws.security.saml.ext.SAMLCallback Callback instance, for example, see this [custom implementation|http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/cxf/trunk/systests/rs-security/src/test/java/org/apache/cxf/systest/jaxrs/security/saml/SamlCallbackHandler.java].
More involved cases with SAML assertions being created by identity providers will be supported, with the help of CXF (WS) STSClient when needed.
h1. SAML Assertion Validation
When SAML assertions are received on the server side, they are validated to make sure that the enveloped signatures are correct. SubjectConfirmation methods (sender-vouches, holder-of-key, bearer) are also checked.
The validation can be delegated to STS if needed. By default, server side SAML handlers have a "samlValidator" property set to an instance of org.apache.ws.security.validate.SamlAssertionValidator which does a thorough validation of the assertion. If needed org.apache.cxf.ws.security.trust.STSSamlAssertionValidator can be set instead which will use STS to validate the assertion.
Custom validators extending WSS4J SamlAssertionValidator and doing the additional application-specific validation can be registered if needed.
Note the fact that the default validation relies a lot on the code heavily utilized by the WS-Security implementation should be of no concern - it is an example of the integration on its own in order to get the validation done. For example, WS-* STS are heavily used in the enterprise today and it simply makes a complete sense to rely on it to validate a SAML assertion if it is possible.
SubjectConfirmation sender-vouches and holder-of-key methods can be easily validated with enveloped SAML assertions given that the embedded SAML signatures and key info can be checked against the signature used to sign the envelope or a custom payload like Book.
At the moment these methods can not be properly validated when the assertion is provided in a header or in the form, the additional signature signing the encoded SAML token will be needed - this will be supported in due time. Use "bearer" in those cases.
h1. SAML Authorization
SAML assertions may contain so-called claims which are represented by a sequence of SAML AttributeStatements containing one or more Attributes, for example:
{code:xml}
<saml2:Assertion>
<!-- ... -->
<saml2:AttributeStatement>
<saml2:Attribute NameFormat="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims"
Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/role"
FriendlyName="subject-role">
<saml2:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xsi:type="xs:string">user</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
<saml2:Attribute NameFormat="http://claims/authentication"
Name="http://claims/authentication-format">
<saml2:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xsi:type="xs:string">password</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
</saml2:AttributeStatement>
<!-- ... -->
</saml2:Assertion>
{code}
An individual claim is scoped by NameFormat and Name attribute. NameFormat is similar to a namespace, while Name identifies what the value of this claim represents, for example, in the above fragment two claims are provided, one has a value "user" which represents a role of the assertion's Subject, another one has a value of "password" which identifies the way Subject authenticated itself, i.e, Subject provided its password (presumably to IDP).
Now, what is interesting is to see if it is possible to use these claims with Role-Based Access-Control (for example, with endpoints relying on @RolesAllowed annotations) as well as with the more complex authorization logic (for example, let this resource be invoked only if Subject used a password to get authenticated at IDP).
h2. Claims Based Access Control
CXF JAX-RS offers an extension letting users to enforce a new fine-grained Claims Based Access Control based on [Claim|http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/cxf/trunk/rt/rs/security/xml/src/main/java/org/apache/cxf/rs/security/saml/authorization/Claim.java] and [Claims|http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/cxf/trunk/rt/rs/security/xml/src/main/java/org/apache/cxf/rs/security/saml/authorization/Claims.java] annotations as well as [ClaimMode|http://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/cxf/trunk/rt/rs/security/xml/src/main/java/org/apache/cxf/rs/security/saml/authorization/ClaimMode.java] enum class.
More to follow...Here is a simple code fragment:
{code:java}
import org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.authorization.Claim;
import org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.authorization.Claims;
@Path("/bookstore")
public class SecureClaimBookStore {
@POST
@Path("/books")
@Produces("application/xml")
@Consumes("application/xml")
@Claims({
@Claim({"admin" }),
@Claim(name = "http://claims/authentication-format",
format = "http://claims/authentication",
value = {"fingertip", "smartcard" })
})
public Book addBook(Book book) {
return book;
}
}
{code}
SecureClaimBookStore.addBook(Book) can only be invoked if Subject meets the following requirement: it needs to have a Claim with a value "admin" and another Claim confirming that it got authenticated using either a 'fingertip' or 'smartcard' method. Note that @Claim({"admin"}) has no name and format classifiers set - it relies on default name and format values, namely "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/role" and "http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims" respectively. These default values may change in the future depending on which claims are found to be used most often - but as you can see you can always provide name and format values which will scope a given claim value.
Note that in the above example, a Claim with the name "http://claims/authentication-format" has two values, 'fingertip' and 'smartcard'. By default, in order to meet this Claim, Subject needs to have a Claim which has either a 'fingertip' or 'smartcard' value. If it is expected that Subject needs to have a Claim which has both 'fingertip' and 'smartcard' values, then the following change needs to be done:
{code:java}
import org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.authorization.Claim;
import org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.authorization.Claims;
@Path("/bookstore")
public class SecureClaimBookStore {
@POST
@Path("/books")
@Produces("application/xml")
@Consumes("application/xml")
@Claims({
@Claim({"admin" }),
@Claim(name = "http://claims/authentication-format",
format = "http://claims/authentication",
value = {"fingertip", "smartcard" },
matchAll = true)
})
public Book addBook(Book book) {
return book;
}
}
{code}
Claims can be specified using individual @Claim annotation, they can be set at the class level and overridden at the method level and finally a lax mode of check can be specified:
{code:java}
import org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.authorization.Claim;
import org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.authorization.Claims;
@Path("/bookstore")
@Claim({"user"})
public class SecureClaimBookStore {
@POST
@Path("/books")
@Produces("application/xml")
@Consumes("application/xml")
@Claims({
@Claim({"admin" }),
@Claim(name = "http://claims/authentication-format",
format = "http://claims/authentication",
value = {"fingertip", "smartcard" },
matchAll = true)
})
public Book addBook(Book book) {
return book;
}
@GET
@Claim(name = "http://claims/authentication-format",
format = "http://claims/authentication",
value = {"password" },
mode = ClaimMode.LAX)
public Book getBook() {
//...
}
@GET
public BookList getBookList() {
//...
}
}
{code}
In the above example, getBookList() can be invoked if Subject has a Claim with the value "user"; addBook() has it overridden - "admin" is expected and the authentication format Claim too; getBook() can be invoked if Subject has a Claim with the value "user" and it also must have the authentication format Claim with the value "password" - or no such Claim at all.
Server Configuration Example:
{code:xml}
<bean id="serviceBeanClaims" class="org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.saml.SecureClaimBookStore"/>
<bean id="samlEnvHandler" class="org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.SamlEnvelopedInHandler">
<property name="securityContextProvider">
<bean class="org.apache.cxf.systest.jaxrs.security.saml.CustomSecurityContextProvider"/>
</property>
</bean>
<bean id="claimsHandler"
class="org.apache.cxf.rs.security.saml.authorization.ClaimsAuthorizingFilter">
<property name="securedObject" ref="serviceBeanClaims"/>
</bean>
<jaxrs:server address="/saml-claims">
<jaxrs:serviceBeans>
<ref bean="serviceBeanClaims"/>
</jaxrs:serviceBeans>
<jaxrs:providers>
<ref bean="samlEnvHandler"/>
<ref bean="claimsHandler"/>
</jaxrs:providers>
</jaxrs:server>
{code}
h2. Role Based Access Control
|