THIS IS A TEST INSTANCE. ALL YOUR CHANGES WILL BE LOST!!!!
Chung-Kwei:
- Teiresias is IBM's pattern-discovery tool from bioinformatics
- looks *directly* transferrable to SpamAssassin's "regexp rules" approach
- probably heavily patented and hard to license though
- but a Google search for "pattern discovery algorithm" looks like a promising source
Social network talk:
- pretty useless; not any spam orientation at all
Joshua Goodman Received talk:
- talking about parsing Received lines
- basically reimplementing spamcop algorithm
- looking for "last external IP address"
- thinks this will be useful for SenderID
- SenderID example uses HELO data, looks like, instead of PRA or SMTP MAIL FROM; due to multiple intervening hops
- try to use heuristics to find last external IP address:
- using MX data fails due to load-balancing edge router
- also the msn.com/hotmail.com problem
- proposed algo:
- IP addr is 192.168
- HELO matches user's domain and forward DNS lookup of HELO matches IP address
- find an IP that matches MX record, next is external
- Bob Atk suggested putting external IP addrs in a DNS record?!
Brett Watson: beyond identity: problems even with sender id
- economics of whitelisting/blacklisting based on a reliable sender identification (ie. forging is no longer possible)
- mostly a philsophical talk
Multiple email addresses:
- about 50% of surveyed users had multiple email addresses
- "identities"; separation of work, personal, social groups; pseudo-anonymity; affiliation, status, prestige (alumni accts)
- mobility (available on the road)
- people now frequently have different "role" accounts
- typically once people go over 3 accts, they set them up to forward to a smaller number
- 20-30% of all email addrs change annually
- this talk is really oriented towards MUA UI developers
- another talk with not a whole lot of antispam relevance
Panel discussion of monetary spam filtering:
- Cynthia Dwork's talk:
- 16 seconds per message computation time doubles spam cost
- 56 seconds per message " means $36 per message for spammers
- cycle theft arguments (zombies are illegal; spyware can be combatted with user @+ education) *already don't work* in the real world
- MailFrontier:
- some kind of marketroid noise about how they're "third generation" because they have grey areas, or something; combination of multiple tests means "definitely spam, no false positives". riiight
- "Reverse Turing Test": C-R as usual
- except the C-R page has some kind of plugin which will burn CPU cycles instead, woo
- The naysayer:
- going rate to solve puzzles is about $.11/hr in South India
- Real Money systems: people will regulate it; EU Directive on E-Money (2000/46/EC)
- people will walk away with 2.5% of it (cost of running + greed)
- people will steal it (e.g. sysadmin skimming x% of incoming mails and stealing their tokens)
- Payment systems: settlement: see taugh.com
- also compares with the telco system (~1200mill ham mails/day, ~2000mill phone calls per day) – much fewer calls on telco system, most local, diff trust model
- how much payment:
- 30 responses per mill: .1c/mail mean $33 per sale to be viable
- if .05c/mail, $16
- at a 0.7% response rate, $33 profit means 23c/mail
- http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/
- questions:
- to Ironport: "why can't I nominate a charity?" to avoid interested parties
- Dan to Ironport: "how much bonds debited?" not very much
- question from an Indian querier: "any documented cases of South Indian kids clicking on CAPTCHAs?" MailFrontier guy, naturally, says "nope". In reality, the answer is "yes", but that was in Thailand
- Yahoo! guy on CAPTCHAs: "seen everything: porn sites, people paid to type them; sites in Russia with full pages of CAPTCHAs, 10 hour turnaround after a new fix is deployed"
- Vanquish guy says they use CMU's CAPTCHA code