EnvelopeRequest handling

Master KIP

KIP-500: Replace ZooKeeper with a Self-Managed Metadata Quorum (Accepted)

Status

Current state: Under Discussion

Discussion thread: here

JIRA: Unable to render Jira issues macro, execution error.

Please keep the discussion on the mailing list rather than commenting on the wiki (wiki discussions get unwieldy fast).

Motivation

As part of the KIP-500 initiative, we need to build a bridge release version of Kafka that could isolate the direct Zookeeper write access only to the controller. Protocols that alter cluster/topic configurations, security configurations or quotas, topics etc, should be migrated for sure as they are still relying on arbitrary broker to Zookeeper write access.

Take config change protocol for example. The current AlterConfig request propagation path is:

1. The admin client issues an (Incremental)AlterConfig request to broker

2. Broker updates the zookeeper path storing the metadata

3. If #2 successful, returns to the client

4. All brokers refresh their metadata upon ZK notification

Here we use ZK as the persistent storage for all the config changes, and even some brokers are not able to get in sync with ZK due to transient failures, a successful update shall be eventually guaranteed. In this KIP we would like to maintain the same level of guarantee, and make the controller as the single writer to modify the config metadata in ZK.

Proposed Changes

Take AlterConfig as an example to understand the changes we are making.

Change AlterConfig Request Routing

During the bridge release, the propagation path shall be revised as:

1. The admin client issues an (Incremental)AlterConfig request to the controller

2. The controller updates the config, and stores it in ZK

3. If #3 successful, returns to the client

4. ZK update will be propagated towards all affected brokers in the cluster

This simple routing change makes sure only controller needs to write to ZK, while other broker shall just wait for the metadata update from ZK notification eventually. As we have the source of truth configs stored in ZK still, any re-election of controller shall be safe.

The above path works with the new admin client we are going to introduce with next release. For older clients, they are not expected to forward the request to controller, so brokers should support the proxy of requests, with a revised update path:

1. The old admin client issues an (Incremental)AlterConfig request to a random broker

2. The broker redirects the request to the controller

3. The controller updates the config, and store it in ZK

4. If #3 successful, returns to the proxy broker

5. The proxy broker returns to the client as success

6. ZK update will be propagated towards all affected brokers in the cluster

This whole update strategy change would be applied to all the direct ZK mutation paths, including:

• AlterConfig

• IncrementalAlterConfig 

• CreateAcls

• DeleteAcls

• AlterClientQuotas

• CreateDelegationToken

• RenewDelegationToken 

• ExpireDelegationToken

Internal CreateTopicsRequest Routing 

Certain edge cases we would also like to fix is for the internal topic creation.

1. FindCoordinator protocol has an internal topic creation logic when the cluster receives the request for the first time as transaction log topic and consumer offset topic are lazily initialized. 
2. MetadataRequest protocol also contains an internal topic creation logic when we are looking for metadata for a non-existing internal topic and auto-topic-creation is enabled.

Currently the target broker shall just utilize its own ZK client to create internal topics, which is disallowed in the bridge release. For above scenarios, non-controller broker shall just send a CreateTopicRequest to the controller instead and let controller take care of the rest, while waiting for the response in the mean time.

One thing to note that at the moment the direct ZK access bypasses the CreateTopicPolicy. To maintain the same guarantee, we would add a whitelist to broker for the two internal topics to bypass topic policy:

1. Transaction log
2. Consumer offset topic

Routing Request Security

For older requests that need redirection, forwarding broker will just use its own authorizer to verify the principals. When the request looks good, it will just forward the request with its own credentials, no second validation needed. The only exceptional case is the controller audit log which needs a principal name of the request, so we will add an optional tag called "PrincipalName" to the header when sending the proxy request.

Public Interfaces

Protocol Bumps

We are going to bump all mentioned mutation APIs above by one version, and new admin client was expected to only talk to the controller. For example we bump the AlterConfig API to v2.

{
  "apiKey": 44,
  "type": "request",
  "name": "IncrementalAlterConfigsRequest",
  // Version 1 is the first flexible version. For new binary deploy, this should always be forwarded to the controller.
  //
  // Version 2 the request shall always route to the controller.
  "validVersions": "0-2",
  "flexibleVersions": "1+",
   "fields": [
    { "name": "Resources", "type": "[]AlterConfigsResource", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The incremental updates for each resource.", "fields": [
      { "name": "ResourceType", "type": "int8", "versions": "0+", "mapKey": true,
        "about": "The resource type." },
      { "name": "ResourceName", "type": "string", "versions": "0+", "mapKey": true,
        "about": "The resource name." },
      { "name": "Configs", "type": "[]AlterableConfig", "versions": "0+",
        "about": "The configurations.",  "fields": [
        { "name": "Name", "type": "string", "versions": "0+", "mapKey": true,
          "about": "The configuration key name." },
        { "name": "ConfigOperation", "type": "int8", "versions": "0+", "mapKey": true,
          "about": "The type (Set, Delete, Append, Subtract) of operation." },
        { "name": "Value", "type": "string", "versions": "0+", "nullableVersions": "0+",
          "about": "The value to set for the configuration key."}
      ]}
    ]},
}

If the request is v1, broker with new AlterConfig protocol enabled should always proxy the request to the controller. If the request is v2, the recipient broker should handle it or respond a NOT_CONTROLLER to ask for rediscovery if it is not the controller.

Same applies for all other mentioned requests as well. The new version request should always go to the controller. If the request is on an older version, broker shall redirect it to the controller.

• AlterConfig to v2

• IncrementalAlterConfig to v2

• CreateAcls to v3

• DeleteAcls to v3

• AlterClientQuotas to v1

• CreateDelegationToken to v3

• RenewDelegationToken to v3

• ExpireDelegationToken to v3

The CreateTopic routing change is purely inter-broker. Since the CreateTopicRequest is already handled by controller only, so no change on this side.

New Tag for Principal Name

We are also going to add a tag field to represent the original request principal name to the request header for controller audit log purpose.

{
  "type": "header",
  "name": "RequestHeader",
  // Version 0 of the RequestHeader is only used by v0 of ControlledShutdownRequest.
  //
  // Version 1 is the first version with ClientId.
  //
  // Version 2 is the first flexible version.
  "validVersions": "0-2",
  "flexibleVersions": "2+",
  "fields": [
    { "name": "RequestApiKey", "type": "int16", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The API key of this request." },
    { "name": "RequestApiVersion", "type": "int16", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The API version of this request." },
    { "name": "CorrelationId", "type": "int32", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The correlation ID of this request." },
    ...
    // ----- new optional field ----
    { "name": "PrincipalName", "type": "string", "tag": 0, "taggedVersions": "2+", "ignorable": true,
      "about": "Optional value of the principal name when the request is redirected by a broker." },
    // ----- end new field ---------
  ]
}

New Secure Endpoint

To maintain the same level of security going along in the post-ZK world, the broker-controller communication should have extra security guarantee. To make that happen, we will introduce a separate `ControllerEndpoint` for user to configure the exclusive access of forwarding requests to only go through this tunnel. Getting a separate communication channel also helps differentiating whether the request is from admin client or forwarded, which means the forwarding brokers don't have to bump the request version unnecessarily.

This part of the design is dependent on the Controller refactoring effort, and more details shall reveal for subsequent KIPs. It won't block the acceptance for this KIP either, since the forwarding behavior shall be the same. 

Monitoring Metrics

To effectively monitor the admin request forwarding status, we would add two metrics:

MBean:kafka.server:type=RequestMetrics,name=NumRequestsForwardingToControllerPerSec,clientId=([-.\w]+)
MBean:kafka.server:type=RequestMetrics,name=NumRequestsForwardingToControllerTotal,clientId=([-.\w]+)

to visualize how many RPC are inflight from each admin client. They will be added via Yammer metrics.

Compatibility, Deprecation, and Migration Plan

The upgrade path shall be guarded by the inter.broker.protocol (IBP) to make sure the routing behavior is consistent. After first rolling bounce to upgrade the binary version, all fellow brokers are still handling ZK mutation requests by themselves. With the second IBP bump rolling bounce, all upgraded brokers will be using the new routing algorithm effectively described in this KIP.

As we discussed in the request routing section, to work with an older client, the first contacted broker need to act as a proxy to redirect the write request to the controller. To support the proxy of requests, we need to build a channel for brokers to talk directly to the controller. This part of the design is internal change only and won’t block the KIP progress.

Rejected Alternatives

• We discussed about the possibility of immediately building a metadata topic to propagate the changes. This seems aligned with the eventual metadata quorum path, but at a cost of blocking the current API migration towards the bridge release, since the metadata quorum design is much more complicated and requires more iterations. To avoid this extra dependency on other tracks, we should go ahead and migrate existing protocols to meet the bridge release goal sooner.

• We thought about adding an alerting metrics called request-forwarding-to-controller-authorization-fail-count in an effort to help administrator detect wrong security setup sooner. However, there should already be metrics monitoring request failures, so this metric could be optional.

• We thought about monitoring older client connections in the long term after bridge release, when we perform some incompatible changes to the Raft Quorum, to better capture the timing for a major version bump. However, KIP-511 also has already exposed metrics like an "unknown" software name and an "unknown" software version which could serve for this purpose.

• We also had an almost complete proposal around forwarding request. Just keep it here for future reference. Although the Envelope API provides certain privileges like data embedding and principal embedding, it creates a security hole by letting a malicious user impersonate any forwarding broker. Passing the principal around also increases the vulnerability, compared with other standard ways such as passing a verified token, but it is unfortunately not fully supported with Kafka security. So for the security concerns, we are abandoning the Envelope approach and fallback to just forward the raw admin requests.

==================================================== Start Old Proposal  ======================================================== 

New Envelope RPC

We are also going to add a new RPC type to wrap the original request during the forwarding. We will make corresponding changes to `ApiMessageTypeGenerator` class to recognize the new field `Header` and `ApiMessage` during the auto generation. This request will be fully wrapping an older version client request, including its header, security information, actual data fields, etc. The request requires ClusterAction on CLUSTER.

Routing Request Security

For audit logging purpose, we proposed to add the following fields:

1. Serialized Principal information
2. Client host ip address
3. Listener name
4. Security protocol being used

{
  "apiKey": N,
  "type": "request",
  "name": "EnvelopeRequest",
  "validVersions": "0",
  "flexibleVersions": "0+",
  "fields": [
    { "name": "RequestHeader", "type": "Header", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The embedded request header." },
	{ "name": "RequestData", "type": "ApiMessage", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The embedded request data."},
	{ "name": "PrincipalInfo", "type": "bytes", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The serialized principal information."},	
    { "name": "ClientHostIP", "type": "string", "versions": "0+"}, 
    { "name": "ListenerName", "type": "string", "versions": "0+"},
    { "name": "SecurityProtocol", "type": "string", "versions": "0+"}
  ]
}

EnvelopeRequest Handling

When receiving an EnvelopeRequest, the broker shall authorize the request with forwarding broker's principal. If the outer request is verified, the broker will continue to unwrap the inner request and handle it as normal, which means it would continue performing authorization for the inner layer principal. For KIP-590 scope, the possible top error codes are:

• NOT_CONTROLLER as we are only forwarding admin write requests.
• CLUSTER_AUTHORIZATION_FAILED if the inter-broker verification failed.

The CLUSTER authorization for EnvelopeRequest takes place during the request handling, similar to LeaderAndIsrRequest. This ensures the EnvelopeRequest is not sent from a malicious client pretending to be a fellow broker. For inner request error, it will still be embedded inside the `ResponseData` struct defined in EnvelopeResponse below.

{
  // Possible top level error code:
  //
  // NOT_CONTROLLER
  // CLUSTER_AUTHORIZATION_FAILED
  //
  "apiKey": N,
  "type": "response",
  "name": "EnvelopeResponse",
  "validVersions": "0",
  "flexibleVersions": "0+",
  "fields": [
    { "name": "ResponseHeader", "type": "Header", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The embedded response header." },
	{ "name": "ResponseData", "type": "ApiMessage", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The embedded response data."},
    { "name": "ErrorCode", "type": "int16", "versions": "0+",
      "about": "The error code, or 0 if there was no error." },
  ]
}

EnvelopeResponse Handling

When the response contains NOT_CONTROLLER error code, the forwarding broker will keep finding the correct controller until request eventually times out. For CLUSTER_AUTHORIZATION_FAILED, this indicates an internal error for broker security setup which has nothing to do with the client, so we have no other way but returning an UNKNOWN_SERVER_ERROR to the admin client. 

For whatever result the controller replies to the inner request, the forwarding broker won't check. As long as the top level has no error, the forwarding broker will claim the request to be successful and reply the inner response to the admin client for the rest of error handling.

KafkaPrincipal Serialization

We shall also bring in a backward-incompatible change to add serializability to the KafkaPrincipalBuilder class:

public interface KafkaPrincipalBuilder {
    ...
	ByteBuffer serialize();

	KafkaPrincipal deserialize(ByteBuffer serializedPrincipal);
}

which requires a non-default implementation to ensure the principal information gets properly compacted into the forwarding request.

Compatibility Breakage

The KafkaPrincipal builder serializability is a binary incompatible change stated in the KIP. For the smooth rollout of this KIP, we will defer this part of the implementation until we hit next major incompatible release, i.e Apache Kafka 3.0. This means we will breakdown the effort as:

1. For next 2.x release:
   1. Get new admin client forwarding changes
   2. Get the Envelope RPC implementation
   3. Get the forwarding path working and validate the function with fake principals in testing environment, without actual triggering in the production system
2. For next 3.0 release:
   1. Introduce serializability to PrincipalBuilder
   2. Turn on forwarding path in production and perform end-to-end testing

==================================================== End Old Proposal  ======================================================== 

Future Works

We have also discussed about migrating the metadata read path to controller-only for read-after-write consistency. This sounds like a nice improvement but needs more discussions on trade-offs between overloading controller and the metadata consistency, also the progress of Raft quorum design as well.